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Abstract—We introduce the notion of two-level fingerprinting
and traceability codes. In this setting, the users are organized in a
hierarchical manner by classifying them into various groups; for
instance, by dividing the distribution area into several geographic
regions, and collecting users from the same region into one group.
Two-level fingerprinting and traceability codes have the following
property: As in traditional (one-level) codes, when given an illegal
copy produced by a coalition of users, the decoder identifies one
of the guilty users if the coalition size is less than a certain
threshold t. Moreover, even when the coalition is of a larger size
s (> t), the decoder still provides partial information by tracing
one of the groups containing a guilty user.
We establish sufficient conditions for a code to possess the
two-level traceability property. In addition, we also provide
constructions for two-level fingerprinting codes and characterize
the corresponding set of achievable rates.
I. INTRODUCTION
In order to protect copyrighted digital content against unau-
thorized distribution or piracy, several combinatorial schemes
have been proposed in the literature (see [4] for a survey). In
this paper, we focus on two such techniques: fingerprinting
codes [5] and traceability codes [6].
The owner (distributor) of the content hides a unique mark
called a fingerprint in each licensed copy bought by a user. The
collection of fingerprint assignments is referred to as a code.
If a naive user distributes a copy of his fingerprinted content
illegally, then the pirated copy can easily be traced back to
the guilty user. However, if a group of users (pirates) form a
coalition to detect the fingerprints and modify/erase them to
create an illegal copy, then tracing a guilty user becomes a
non-trivial task.
Fingerprinting and traceability codes assign fingerprints in
such a way that given an illegal copy, the distributor can use
a tracing algorithm to identify at least one of the pirates as
long as the coalition size does not exceed a certain threshold t,
which is a parameter of the problem. However, if the coalition
size exceeds this threshold, the output of the tracing algorithm
can be useless.
To overcome this weakness, we formalize the notion of
multi-level fingerprinting codes, which are inspired by error-
correcting codes with unequal error protection used in commu-
nications problems (cf. for instance Bassalygo et al. [3]). We
focus on the simplest case of two-level fingerprinting codes in
this paper, but the concepts introduced apply to an arbitrary
number of protection levels.
In this setting, the users are organized in a hierarchical
manner, for instance, according to geographical location. The
distribution area is divided into several regions, and users
from the same region are collected into one group. The
two-level fingerprinting codes studied in this paper have the
following property: As in traditional (one-level) codes, the
tracing algorithm determines at least one of the guilty users if
the coalition size is at most t. Moreover, even when a larger
number s (> t) of pirates participate, the algorithm provides
partial information by retrieving the index of a group that
contains a member of the pirate coalition.
Formal definitions are available in Section II. In Section III,
we obtain sufficient conditions for two-level traceability codes.
Finally, we provide constructions for two-level fingerprinting
codes and analyze the achievable rates in Section IV.
II. PROBLEM STATEMENT
Consider the problem where the content is to be distributed
to M1M2 users organized in M1 groups, each of which
contains M2 users. Assume that there is some ordering of the
groups, and of the users within each group. Thus, any user u
is identified by a pair of indices u ≡ (u1, u2) ∈ [M1]× [M2],
where the notation [n] stands for the set {1, . . . , n}. For a user
u = (u1, u2), let G(u) be its group index, i.e., G(u) = u1.
The distributor hides a distinctive fingerprint in each legal
copy. The fingerprints are assumed to be distributed inside the
host message so that their location is unknown to the users.
The location of the fingerprints is the same for all users.
Let n denote the length of the fingerprints. Let Q denote an
alphabet of (finite) size q, usually taken to be {0, . . . , q − 1}
with modulo q addition. An (n,M)q (one-level) code (C,D)
is a pair of encoding and decoding mappings C : [M ]→ Qn,
D : Qn → [M ] ∪ {0}, where the decoder output 0 signifies
a decoding failure. For convenience, we sometimes abuse
terminology by calling the range of C a code, and use the
same notation C for it.
The distributor’s strategy of assigning fingerprints to users
may be either deterministic or randomized as explained in the
following subsections. Randomization can potentially increase
the number of users that can be supported for a given finger-
print length at the cost of a small error probability.
Notation: Throughout we will denote random variables
(r.v.’s) by capital letters and their realizations by lower case
letters. The Hamming distance between vectors x,y will be
written as dH(x,y), while |x| denotes the Hamming weight
of x. If X is a set of vectors, we abbreviate minx∈X dH(x,y)
as dH(X ,y). We will denote the q-ary entropy function
by h(x) = −x logq x/(q − 1) − (1 − x) logq(1 − x).
For two functions f(n), g(n), we write f(n) .= g(n) if
limn→∞ n
−1 log(f(n)/g(n)) = 0.
A. Deterministic Codes
An (n,M1,M2)q two-level code (C,D1, D2) is a triple
consisting of one encoding and two decoding mappings
C : [M1]× [M2]→ Q
n,
D1 : Q
n → [M1] ∪ {0},
D2 : Q
n → ([M1]× [M2]) ∪ {0},
(1)
with 0 signifying a decoding failure. A two-level deterministic
assignment of fingerprints is given by the encoding mapping
C of such a two-level code. The rate pair of an (n,M1,M2)q
two-level code is defined as
(R1, R2) :=
(
1
n
logqM1,
1
n
logqM2
)
.
A coalition of users is an arbitrary subset of [M1]× [M2].
Members of the coalition are commonly referred to as pirates.
A coalition U has access to the collection of fingerprints,
namely C(U), that are assigned to it. Let U be a coalition of t
users and suppose C(U) = {x1, . . . ,xt}. In order to conceal
their identities from the distributor, the coalition’s members
attempt to create a pirated copy with a modified fingerprint
y ∈ Qn. We assume that the code (C,D1, D2) is public and
can be used by the pirates in designing their attack.
Note that although the fingerprint locations are not avail-
able to the pirates, they may detect some of these locations
by comparing their copies for differences and modify the
detected positions. Coordinate i of the fingerprints is called
undetectable for the coalition U if x1i = x2i = · · · = xti and
is called detectable otherwise. The set of forgeries that can be
created by the coalition in this manner is called the envelope
and is given by:
E(x1, . . . ,xt) =
{
y ∈ Qn
∣∣ yi ∈ {x1i, . . . , xti}, ∀i ∈ [n]} .
(2)
Given a pirated copy with a forged fingerprint, the distribu-
tor performs tracing based on D1 and D2 to locate one of the
pirates. The decoder D2 attempts to trace the exact identity of
one of the pirates, while D1 focuses only on locating a group
containing at least one of the pirates.
In order to extend the notion of traceability to two-level
codes, let us consider the case where the tracing is accom-
plished using minimum distance (MD) decoding. Specifically,
we take
D2(y) = arg min
u∈[M1]×[M2]
dH(C(u),y),
D1(y) = G(D2(y)).
(3)
If the minimum distance above is attained for multiple users,
the decoder D2 outputs any one of the closest users. This
leads us to the notion of two-level traceability codes in the
deterministic setting.
Definition 2.1: A two-level code C has (t1, t2)-traceability
property (or is (t1, t2)-TA) where t1 > t2 if:
(a) For any coalition U of size at most t2 and any y ∈
E(C(U)), the decoding result D2(y) ∈ U .
(b) For any coalition U of size at most t1 and any y ∈
E(C(U)), the decoding result D1(y) ∈ G(U).
We observe that an (n,M1,M2)q two-level code which
is (t1, t2)-TA has the t2-TA property when viewed as an
(n,M1M2)q one-level code; moreover, for coalitions of the
larger size t1, one of the groups containing a pirate is closer
to the forgery compared to the remaining groups. In this paper,
we examine sufficient conditions under which a two-level code
has the (t1, t2)-traceability property.
B. Randomized Codes
A randomized strategy to assign fingerprints is defined as
the following random experiment. The distributor has a family
of (n,M1,M2)q two-level codes {(Ck, D1k, D2k), k ∈ K},
where K is a finite set of “keys”. The distributor chooses one
of the keys according to a probability distribution (pi(k), k ∈
K). If the key k is selected, then fingerprints are assigned
according to Ck and tracing is done using D1k and D2k. The
code resulting from this random experiment is called a (two-
level) randomized code and is denoted by (C,D1,D2).
Following the standard convention in cryptography of the
system design being publicly available, we allow the users to
have knowledge of the family of codes {(Ck, D1k, D2k)} and
the distribution pi(·), while the exact key choice is kept secret
by the distributor.
Consider a coalition U of size t. Any attack by the coalition
can be modeled as a randomized strategy V (·|·, . . . , ·), where
V (y|x1, . . . ,xt) gives the probability that the coalition creates
y given that it observes the fingerprints x1, . . . ,xt. Our
interest is in a special class of strategies which satisfy the
restrictions (2) in creating a forgery. A strategy V is called
admissible if
V (y|x1, . . . ,xt) = 0 for all y /∈ E(x1, . . . ,xt).
Let Vt denote the class of admissible strategies.
Denote the random forgery generated by U using the
strategy V by YC,U,V . The distributor, on observing the forged
fingerprint, employs the decoders D1k and D2k while using
the key k. For a given coalition U and strategy V , we define
the following error probabilities:
e1(C,D1, U, V ) = P [D1(YC,U,V ) /∈ G(U)]
= E
∑
y:D1K(y)/∈G(U)
V (y|CK (U)),
e2(C,D2, U, V ) = P [D2(YC,U,V ) /∈ U ]
= E
∑
y:D2,K(y)/∈U
V (y|CK (U)),
where the expectation is over the r.v. K with distribution pi(k).
Definition 2.2: A randomized code (C,D1,D2) is said to
be a (t1, t2)-fingerprinting with ε-error where t1 > t2 if:
(a) For any coalition U of size at most t2 and any admissible
strategy V , the error probability e2(C,D2, U, V ) ≤ ε.
(b) For any coalition U of size at most t1 and any admissible
strategy V , the error probability e1(C,D1, U, V ) ≤ ε.
We observe that an (n,M1,M2)q two-level code which is
(t1, t2)-fingerprinting has the t2-fingerprinting property when
viewed as an (n,M1M2)q one-level code; in addition, for the
larger size-t1 coalitions, the tracing algorithm can locate a
group containing one of the pirates with high probability.
A rate pair (R1, R2) is said to be achievable for
q-ary (t1, t2)-fingerprinting if there exists a sequence
of (n, qnR1n , qnR2n)q randomized codes that are (t1, t2)-
fingerprinting with error probability εn such that
lim
n→∞
εn = 0, lim inf
n→∞
Rin = Ri, i = 1, 2.
The goal of this paper is to investigate constructions of two-
level fingerprinting codes and to characterize the correspond-
ing set of achievable rate pairs.
Remark 2.3: 1) If an (n,M1,M2)q two-level code is
(t1, t2)-fingerprinting (resp., TA), then choosing any
single user from every group forms an (n,M1)q one-
level code that is t1-fingerprinting (resp., TA).
2) If an (n,M1M2)q one-level code is t1-fingerprinting
(resp., TA), then for any t2 < t1, it can also be
treated as a (n,M1,M2)q two-level code that is (t1, t2)-
fingerprinting (resp., TA).
III. TRACEABILITY CODES
It is known [6] that a one-level code of length n is t-TA if
the distance between any pair of fingerprints is strictly greater
than n(1 − 1/t2). We wish to obtain an analogous result for
the case of two-level codes.
For a given two-level code C, we define the following
minimum distances:
d1(C) := min
u,v∈[M1]×[M2]
u1 6=v1
dH(C(u), C(v)), (4)
d2(C) := min
u,v∈[M1]×[M2]
u2 6=v2
dH(C(u), C(v)). (5)
Let d(C) = min (d1(C), d2(C)).
Proposition 3.1: Suppose t1 > t2 and C is a two-level code
of length n with d1(C) > n(1−1/t21) and d2(C) > n(1−
1/t22). Then C is (t1, t2)-TA.
Proof: It is straightforward to see that the assumptions
in the proposition imply that d(C) > n(1− 1/t22). Therefore,
property (a) in Definition 2.1 follows directly from the result
for one-level codes.
Next, we show that property (b) is a consequence of
d1(C) > n(1− 1/t
2
1). Let U be a coalition of size at most t1
and y ∈ E(C(U)). Then, there exists some user u ∈ U who
coincides with y in at least n/t1 coordinates. For any user u′
such that G(u′) /∈ G(U), the number of agreements with y is
at most t1(n−d1(C)) < nt1 , thus establishing property (b).
IV. FINGERPRINTING CODES
For w ∈ [n], denote Sw,n := {x ∈ Qn : |x| = w}. For
R1, R2 ∈ [0, 1], define M1n = ⌊qnR1⌋, M2n = ⌊qnR2⌋.
Fix ω ∈ [0, 1]. We take n such that w = ωn is an integer
and construct an (n,M1n,M2n)q two-level randomized code
(Cωn ,D
ω
1n,D
ω
2n) as follows.
For i ∈ [M1n], pick vectors Ri independently and uniformly
at random from Qn. We will refer to the Ri’s as “centers”.
Choose Sij , (i, j) ∈ [M1n] × [M2n], independently and uni-
formly at random from Sw,n. Generate M1nM2n fingerprints
Xij = Ri + Sij , (i, j) ∈ [M1n]× [M2n]
and assign Xij as the fingerprint for user (i, j).
Once the fingerprints are assigned, tracing is based on the
MD decoder (3). The MD decoder may be sub-optimal in gen-
eral; however, it is amenable for analysis in our construction.
In the following subsections, we analyze the error proba-
bility and characterize the achievable rate pairs for the above
construction. The lemmas below will be useful in the analysis.
Lemma 4.1: Let S have a uniform distribution on Sw,n.
Then, for l ∈ [n] and a ∈ Q\{0}, P [Sl = a] = ω/(q − 1).
Moreover, the r.v.’s {Sl, l ∈ [n]} are asymptotically pairwise
independent.
Lemma 4.2: Fix p ∈ [0, 1] and ε > 0. For l ∈ [n], let Zl be
a Bernoulli r.v. with P [Zl = 1] = p, and let {Zl, l ∈ [n]} be
pairwise independent. Then, with Z :=
∑
l∈[n] Zl, we have
P [Z /∈ [n(p− ε), n(p+ ε)]] ≤
p(1− p)
ε2n
.
Notation: For a coalition U = {u1, . . . ,ut}, we denote the
realizations of Xui ,Rui
1
,Sui by xi, ri, si respectively, with
xi = ri + si, i ∈ [t]. Let z ∈ Qt be a vector. Denote by
sz(x1, . . . ,xt) the number of columns equal to zT in the
matrix whose rows are x1, . . . ,xt. For p ∈ [0, 1] and ε > 0,
define In(p, ε) := [n(p− ε), n(p+ ε)].
A. (t, 1)-fingerprinting
First, we consider the (2, 1)-fingerprinting property. This is
the simplest case of two-level fingerprinting that goes beyond
the known techniques for one-level codes. Although coalitions
of size 1 are trivial to handle for one-level fingerprinting, it is
still non-trivial to construct a (2, 1)-fingerprinting code.
Theorem 4.3: For any ω ∈ [0, (q − 1)/2q], the randomized
code (Cωn ,Dω1n,Dω2n) is (2, 1)-fingerprinting with error proba-
bility decaying to 0 if
R1 < 1− h((q − 1)/2q + ω), (6)
R2 < h(ω). (7)
Discussion: The above theorem provides a set of achievable
rate pairs for q-ary (2, 1)-fingerprinting. Let us fix Q = {0, 1}
and put the result in the perspective of bounds available for
one-level fingerprinting (see Figure 1).
• Outer bound: Since the (2, 1)-fingerprinting property
implies one-level 1-fingerprinting, we should have R1 +
R2 ≤ 1. Moreover, R1 cannot exceed the rate of a
one-level 2-fingerprinting code (by part (1) of Remark
2.3); thus, any upper bound for it also applies to R1. In
particular, by [7] R1 ≤ 0.25.
• Inner bound: By part (2) of Remark 2.3, the rate pairs
(R1, R2) such that R1+R2 < 0.188 are achievable (with
MD decoding) using the 2-fingerprinting code given in
[8]. In fact, by allowing other decoders, we can do better,
achieving R1 + R2 < 0.25 through the 2-fingerprinting
construction in [2].
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
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Fig. 1. Achievable rate region for binary (2, 1)-fingerprinting. The bounds
from previous works follow by using one-level fingerprinting schemes.
Proof: (of Theorem 4.3) Size-1 coalitions: Let u =
(u1, u2) be the pirate. For size-1 coalitions, the envelope is
degenerate as it consists of only the user’s own fingerprint.
Now,
e2(C
ω
n ,D
ω
2n,u)
= P [∃u′ 6= u : Xu′ = Xu]
≤ P [∃u′ 6= u : u′1 = u1,Xu′ = Xu]
+P [∃u′ 6= u : u′1 6= u1,Xu′ = Xu]
(a)
≤ P
[
∃u′2 6= u2 : Su1u′2 = Su1u2
]
+P
[
∃u′1 6= u1 : dH(Ru′1 ,Xu) ≤ w
]
(b)
≤ qnR2P
[
Su1u′2 = Su1u2
]
+ qnR1P
[
dH(Ru′
1
,Xu) ≤ w
]
.
= q−n(h(ω)−R2) + q−n(1−h(ω)−R1),
where (a) is due to the fact that if the fingerprint of another user
matches with the pirate’s fingerprint, then the corresponding
center is within distance w from the pirate’s fingerprint, and
(b) follows from the union bound. Consequently, the error
probability for size-1 coalitions approaches 0 if R2 < h(ω)
and R1 < 1− h(ω).
Size-2 coalitions: There are two possibilities: either both
users are in the same group or they are in different groups.
It turns out that the latter case is the dominant one. Since
the analysis for the two cases is similar, we only consider the
latter case below.
Let U = {u1,u2} be such a coalition. For any strategy
V ∈ V2, we have
e1(C
ω
n ,D
ω
1n, U, V )
=
∑
r1,r2,s1,s2
P [r1, r2, s1, s2]
∑
y
V (y|x1,x2)
×P
[
Dω1n(y) /∈ G(U)
∣∣∣r1, r2, s1, s2
]
. (8)
Consider the inner probability term
P
[
Dω1n(y) /∈ G(U)
∣∣∣r1, r2, s1, s2
]
(a)
≤ P [∃u′ /∈ U : u′1 /∈ G(U), dH(Xu′ ,y) ≤ dH({x1,x2},y)]
(b)
≤ P
[
∃u′1 /∈ G(U) : dH(Ru′1 ,y) ≤ dH({x1,x2},y) + w
]
≤ qnR1P
[
dH(Ru′
1
,y) ≤ dH({x1,x2},y) + w
]
,
where we have exploited the independence in the construction
in (a), and (b) follows because if the fingerprint of another user
is within distance d from y, then the corresponding center is
within d+ w from y. For ε > 0, define
T εn :=
{
(r1, r2, s1, s2) :
∀a ∈ Q,
s(a,a)(x1,x2) ∈ In(1/q
2, ε/q)
}
.
Observe that Xu1 and Xu2 are independent and uniformly
distributed overQn. Therefore, using Lemma 4.2, it is a simple
matter to show that P
[
(Ru1
1
,Ru1
2
,Su1 ,Su2) /∈ T
ε
n
]
decays to
0 as n → ∞. Now, take any (r1, r2, s1, s2) ∈ T εn and y ∈
E(x1,x2). The number of undetectable positions in {x1,x2}
is at least n(1/q − ε), implying that dH({x1,x2},y) ≤
n
2
(
1− 1q + ε
)
. Thus, in this case
qnR1P
[
dH(Ru′
1
,y) ≤ dH({x1,x2},y) + w
]
≤ qnR1P
[
dH(Ru′
1
,y) ≤
n
2
(
1−
1
q
+ ε
)
+ w
]
.
= q−n(1−h(
1
2
(1− 1q+ε)+ω)−R1).
Substituting the above in (8) and taking ε → 0, we conclude
that the error probability for size-2 coalitions approaches 0 if
(6) holds.
We now extend the techniques to larger coalitions.
Theorem 4.4: For any ω such that t−1t
(
1− 1qt−1
)
+ω ≤ q−1q ,
the randomized code (Cωn ,Dω1n,Dω2n) is (t, 1)-fingerprinting
with error probability decaying to 0 if
R1 < 1− h
(
t− 1
t
(
1−
1
qt−1
)
+ ω
)
, (9)
R2 < h(ω). (10)
Proof: Size-1 coalitions: For a single pirate u, the analysis
in Theorem 4.3 proves that the probability of decoding error
approaches 0 if R2 < h(ω) and R1 < 1− h(ω).
Size-t coalitions: It can be shown that the case where the t
pirates are in distinct groups is the dominant one. Once this
is shown, we use exactly the same arguments as in the case
of size-2 coalitions in Theorem 4.3. We finally obtain that the
error probability for coalitions of size t approaches 0 if (9)
holds.
Remark 4.5: A sufficiently large alphabet is required in
order for an ω satisfying t−1t
(
1− 1qt−1
)
+ω ≤ q−1q to exist.
For instance, it suffices to take q ≥ t+ 1.
B. (t, 2)-fingerprinting
Let q ≥ 3. For ω, γ, α, β ∈ [0, 1], with α ≤ 1 − γ, β ≤ γ,
α+ β ≤ ω, ω − α ≤ γ, let
ϕ(ω, γ, α, β)
:= (1− γ)h
(
α
1− γ
)
+ (γ − β)h
(
ω − α− β
γ − β
)
+ γh
(
β
γ
)
+ (ω − α) logq
(
q − 2
q − 1
)
− β logq(q − 2).
Let
δ1(ω) =
1
2
(
1− (1 − ω)2 −
ω2
q − 1
)
,
δ2(ω) =
1
2
(
1−
1
q
)
,
f1(ω) = max
γ,α,β:
ω2≤γ≤1−(1−ω)2,γ−β+α≤δ1(ω)
ϕ(ω, γ, α, β),
f2(ω) = max
γ,α,β:
ω( q−1q )≤γ≤1−
1−ω
q
,γ−β+α≤δ2(ω)
ϕ(ω, γ, α, β).
Theorem 4.6: Let q ≥ 3. For any ω such that t−1t
(
1 −
1
qt−1
)
+ ω ≤ q−1q , the randomized code (C
ω
n ,D
ω
1n,D
ω
2n) is
(t, 2)-fingerprinting with error probability decaying to 0 if
R1 < 1− h
(
t− 1
t
(
1−
1
qt−1
)
+ ω
)
, (11)
R2 < h(ω)−max(f1(ω), f2(ω)). (12)
Proof: Size-t coalitions are handled in the same way as
in Theorem 4.4.
Size-2 coalitions: There are two possibilities depending on
whether the pirates belong to the same group or not. We sketch
the case where they are in different groups below. The other
case is analyzed similarly.
Consider a coalition U = {u1,u2}, where the users are in
different groups, and let V ∈ V2 be an admissible strategy.
We have
e2(C
ω
n ,D
ω
2n, U, V )
=
∑
r1,r2,s1,s2
P [r1, r2, s1, s2]
∑
y
V (y|x1,x2)
×P [Dω2n(y) /∈ U |r1, r2, s1, s2] . (13)
Now,
[Dω2n(y) /∈ U ] = E1 ∪ E2 ∪E3,
where, the events E1, E2, E3 are formed of those u′ /∈ U
that satisfy dH(Xu′ ,y) ≤ dH({x1,x2},y) and the conditions
u′1 = u
1
1, u
′
1 = u
2
1, u
′
1 /∈ G(U), respectively. The error event
E3 was already analyzed in Theorem 4.3 and its conditional
probability approaches 0 if (6) holds. We consider E1 below.
The analysis for E2 is identical by symmetry.
P
[
E1
∣∣∣r1, r2, s1, s2
]
= P
[
∃u′2 6= u
1
2 : dH(r1 + Su1
1
u′
2
,y) ≤ dH({x1,x2},y)
]
≤ qnR2P
[
dH(r1 + Su1
1
u′
2
,y) ≤ dH({x1,x2},y)
]
= qnR2P
[
dH(Su1
1
u′
2
,y′) ≤ dH({s1, r1 + x2},y
′)
]
, (14)
where y′ = y + r1 ∈ E(s1, r1 + x2). In this case, we use
Lemmas 4.1 and 4.2 to show that
T εn :=

(r1, r2, s1, s2) :
s(0,0)(s1, r1 + x2) ≃ n
1−ω
q
s(a,a′)(s1, r1 + x2) ≃ n
ω
(q−1)q
∀a, a′ ∈ Q\{0}

 .
is the typical set. For simplicity, we have omitted ε and will
use the approximate relations ≃, ., & in its place. Now, take
any (r1, r2, s1, s2) ∈ T εn and y′ ∈ E(s1, r1+x2). The number
of undetectable positions in {s1, r1+x2} is ≃ n/q, while the
number of coordinates where both symbols are non-zero is
≃ nω(q− 1)/q. This implies dH({s1, r1 +x2},y′) . nδ2(ω)
and nω(q − 1)/q . |y′| . n(1− (1− ω)/q).
Let |y′| = γn, where γ ∈ [0, 1]. Then
P
[
dH(Su1
1
u′
2
,y′) ≤ nδ2(ω)
]
.
= q−nE(ω,γ),
where
E(ω, γ) = h(ω)− max
α,β:
γ−β+α≤δ2(ω)
ϕ(ω, γ, α, β).
Since γ can be chosen by the pirates such that ω q−1q . γ .
1− 1−ωq , by substituting the above in (14), we conclude that
the conditional probability of E1 (and E2) approaches 0 if
R2 < h(ω)− f2(ω). Similarly, we obtain R2 < h(ω)− f1(ω)
when the pirates are in the same group.
Let us show that the rate region thus defined is nontrivial.
Given ω and γ, the maximizing values of the other arguments
of ϕ are α = ω(1− γ) and β = ωγ/(q − 1), so
ϕ(ω, γ, α, β) ≤ h(ω)− γω
(
logq
q − 1
q − 2
+
logq(q − 2)
q − 1
)
.
Consequently, we get max(f1(ω), f2(ω)) ≤ h(ω)−D, where
D = D(ω) = ω3
(
logq
q−1
q−2 +
logq(q−2)
q−1
)
and D(ω) > 0 for
all ω > 0. This shows that the r.-h.s. of (12) is positive. By
Remark 4.5, the r.-h.s. of (11) is also positive if q ≥ t+1 and
t−1
t
(
1 − 1qt−1
)
+ ω < q−1q . This calculation can be further
refined because of the additional constraints on the parameters
α, β, γ mentioned above.
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